There is a significant degree of regulatory fragmentation in telecommunications to the extent that at least a telecommunications or industry-specific agency (ISA) and the antitrust agency (AA) coincide in enforcing rules in this business. In this paper, I analyze the determinants of the institutional arrangements observed between the institutions involved in telecommunications regulation corresponding to a crosscountry sample (26 countries of the OECD area). I find that the determining factors for preferring more involvement of the ISA are generally related to explicit and implicit safeguards against its problems of enforcement transparency or administrative control. Similarly, the determining factors for preferring more involvement of the AA are implicit safeguards against its effectiveness "disadvantage" for performing regulation in a complex business. Finally, alternative explanations associated to regulatory credibility and importance of social goals among others are also controlled JEL-classification: L40, L51, L96
Introduction
Separation or fragmentation of regulatory responsibilities among several regulatory agencies has become more frequent and significant in several sectors leading t o more importance of coordination and institutional interface issues among agencies. This jurisdiction sharing is not new to the extent that it has been a common feature that industry-specific agencies (ISAs) enforce regulations over sectors that are also under the scrutiny of other more general agencies: environmental, labor and tax agencies among However the novel feature of the recent process in the telecommunications business and other network industries is the overlapping scope of the ISA's, Ministry departments and the Antitrust Agencies (AA´s) over common regulatory issues or closely related and interdependent issues. Consequently, the task and agenda assignment in telecommunications becomes less clear and the decisions on what responsibilities are assigned to each one, the coordination schemes and leading roles to be set become relevant policy issues.
Firstly, the worldwide process of privatization and liberalization in telecommunications called for a reform of the regulatory framework to support the success of both processes. In most of the cases, the preference of industry specific regulation was renovated, although with the shift of regulatory responsibilities from central Government offices (Ministry departments) to, more or less, independent telecommunications-specific agencies. Secondly, in some cases, the previous choice was reverted; either because no industry-specific agency is created with liberalization (New Zealand) or because years after their creation, the trend towards more involvement of generic regulatory frameworks is accelerated (Australia and the UK).
This paper develops an empirical analysis of the economic model developed in Castro In practice, institutional preference for the ISA in telecommunications is generally based on its competence or effectiveness advantage for performing regulatory enforcement because of the technology and operational complexity of telecommunications, the ISA's faster decision track based on more prescriptive powers, its more specialized human and informational assets, wider scope of regulatory issues on its agenda and the long history of industry-specific regulation. Therefore, governments and agency stakeholders tend to perceive R' ISA < R' AA .
Similarly, institutional preference for the AA is usually based on its transparency advantages and easier-to-control procedures. Such "superiority" is explained by its lower exposure to regulatory capture, to the extent that more generic human and knowledge assets reduce the risk of revolving-doors episodes. Additionally, a larger and more dispersed number of agents with "networking" with that agency and expertise already built in antitrust procedures and jurisprudence, the requirement on the antitrust framework to make its criteria and decisions consistent across sectors, its disadvantage to make strategic choice of regulatory instruments (and side-contracts) more immune to administrative controls and scrutiny 1 make the AA less capable to build collusive deals.
Consequently, governments and agency stakeholders tend to perceive T' ISA > T' AA .
Literature is not extensive in the empirical analysis of institutional arrangements in regulation, in particular of the telecommunications business. Levy and Spiller (1996) provides a country case approach for analyzing the effect of institutional arrangements on t elecommunications performance, identifying the political framework and its Few references of analysis of the institutional choice for regulation in telecommunications are available to consider alternative explanations to the institutional arrangements between more industry-specific bodies and the standard antitrust agency. Knieps (1997) considers that the existence of monopolistic bottlenecks in telecommunications business and asymmetric criteria applied to dominant operators with respect to other players are key determinants for maintaining sector-specific regulation instead of migrating towards the antitrust regime 2 .
Similarly, Shelanski (2002) and Geradin (2000) argue that the larger the importance of interconnection and unbundling issues, as well as the regulation of Universal Service Obligations USO's in telecommunications the larger the involvement of the ISA. Both lines of analysis might easily coincide with the competence-transparency explanation as far as industry-specific regulation is preferred in those contexts (network bottlenecks, interconnection and unbundling, asymmetric regulation and USO's) when it is perceived as better prepared to face their demanding requirements of expertise. This is consistent with the perception of competence advantage of the ISA over the AA.
A second line of explanation may come from an extension of the analysis of delegation of regulatory responsibilities, based on a Credibility Explanation. According to it, regulatory delegation to independent regulatory agencies is a decision taken to generate a powerful signal to market players of credible commitment with a certain policy line (similar argument as used by Levy and Spiller (1996) , Stern and Trillas (2002) and Faure-Grimaud and Martimort (2003)). In telecommunications, the need to privatize and generate investments in a business and regulatory context with large time inconsistency deficits may justify these policy commitments.
Delegation might be performed either towards an Industry-Specific Agency or towards an Antitrust Agency, but comparing both institutions in telecommunications the delegation movement seem stronger towards the latter rather than the former.
Delegation of regulatory powers in telecommunications has historically implied transferring jurisdiction enforced by a Ministry in Post and Telecommunications (MPT).
Since MPT's have been institutional and jurisdictionally closer to the ISA concept than to the AA, delegation would be stronger when it applies to AA 3 . Gilardi (2002) finds empirical support for a Credibility Explanation as determinant of such delegation and finds that political instability positively determines the degree of delegation.
Consequently and based on the assumption that in telecommunications there is more asymmetric regulation, phasing out of sector-specific regulation becomes more difficult and less probable" delegation by transferring jurisdiction to the AA than to the ISA, the involvement of the AA would be positively affected by the lack of political constraints.
Finally, the degree of involvement of the ISA in regulation is also expected to increase wit h the degree of regulatory intensity. Cave (1997) and Bergman et al. (1999) consider that prescriptive powers of the ISA should join the increase of regulatory intensity during the transition period from monopoly to competition in telecommunications.
The approach of this paper addresses some limitations of the existing literature. Firstly, the paper analyzes the institutional arrangements as the object of study whereas most the references include them as determinant factors, without providing an explanation of such arrangements. Secondly, this exercise is focused on the institutional arrangements among the telecommunications-specific regulator, the Ministry responsible for telecoms policy and the Antitrust Agency, which is a feature with very little attent ion paid by the literature. Although there are several analytical exercises using regulatory and institutional databases, those cases considering institutional arrangements between the referred agencies analyze them with a descriptive and qualitative approach, whereas this paper uses a scoring measures of such arrangements in different regulatory domains, as well a composite index of them. Finally, the segmentation of the sets of explanatory variables between transparency and competence proxies allows analyzing the role of institutional expertise and administrative control in designing agencies.
The plan of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we described the proxies of institutional arrangements used as dependent variables. In section 3, the set of explanatory variables is described and classified according to their competence or transparency nature. In section 4, the results of regression analysis on the five regulatory domains and their composite index are assessed. Finally, section 5 provides a discussion of results and insights for further research based on them.
Dependent variable: Institutional arrangement
In this paper, institutional arrangements designed to enforce telecommunications The score scale applied to these five domains (from 1 to 3) increases with the degree of responsibility allocated to the ISA. Consequently, a score 1 was assigned to those cases in which the AA had the largest involvement among the country sample. The obtained database show that institutional arrangements in these regulatory domains reflect that most of the countries had at least certain level of joint jurisdiction among considered the institutions which implies several domains with the intermediate value (score 2).
Other important domains such as spectrum allocation, technical and quality control and numbering management, among others were avoided in the analysis due to lack of variety in their institutional arrangements required to identify determining factors.
In addition to such domain-specific measures, a composite i ndex of them is also included in order to analyze what explain the overall institutional arrangement in telecommunications policy. Unlike several approaches for aggregating indexes, this composite index was not defined from qualitative or expert valuation methods but it was built from a data-based approach and using factor analysis to weight each separate index. Consequently, the overall composite index is capturing as much of the data variance as possible, allowing that each separate domain have a weight on the resulting index according to its variance pattern.
Explanatory variables: enforcement effectiveness and transparency
In order to develop a model specification for explaining these institutional arrangements 
Table 1: Descriptive indicators of independent variables
Some of the variables were obtained from the OECD International Regulation Database, a large set of indicators (over 1.100 variables) on economy-wide product market regulations 4 , competition rules and enforcement, sector-specific product market regulations, regulatory settings and market structures 5 .
The set of explanatory variables corresponding to the competence dimension contains: size of the sample for regressions, this procedure allowed us to capture the effect of these variables with a smaller reduction of degrees of freedom. Based on the variable concepts presented bellow, the larger the value of ENFSPEED the faster the enforcement based on the antitrust framework and the larger the expected involvement of the AA in regulatory activities.
Speed of antitrust enforcement (ENFSPEED). It was assembled through hierarchical scoring of three other indicators of the Antitrust Agency speed of enforcement: (i) the

AA's process for mandatory orders and imprisonment (AAPRISON) (ii) whether or not unfair competition may be prohibited independently of other violations (UNFCOMP) and (iii) the existence of Special mechanisms of business intervention of the Government (GOLDSHR).
i. We have used AAPRISON as a proxy of the speed of AA's sanction procedures. The scale has three values (0 to 2) and the larger the value the more autonomous and faster the procedure. The largest value corresponds to a legal framework in which the AA is able t o impose the imprisonment or mandatory order directly, the following value corresponds to the case in which the AA should apply it to other governmental body and finally, the lowest value is for the cases in which it should be applied to a court. Since this is an indicator of AA competence to enforce regulation, it is expected that the larger the independence and discretion to impose mandatory orders (larger values of AAPRISON and consequently larger ENFSPEED) the larger the involvement of the AA in the considered regulatory domains.
ii. UNFCOMP is a dummy that takes value 1 when such prohibition is present and 0 when it is not. We interpret this scheme is equivalent to a per se prohibition. As the prohibition is independent of any other condition -specially abuse of dominant position-, the framework only requires the mere verification of unfair competition behavior to activate the prohibition. In practice, this prevents the AA from long procedures of assessment and case building. Since this is an indicator of A A competence to enforce regulation, it is expected that per se prohibition of unfair competition (value 1 of UNFCOMP) increases the involvement of the AA in the considered regulatory domains.
iii. GOLDSHR is a dummy that takes value 1 for the existence of Golden Shares to know about and influence the incumbent operation. A reference case of them in telecommunications is the Kiwi Share in New Zealand that provides Government capacity to enforce several issues on the incumbent 6 . Golden Shares or equivalent mecha nisms give the Government an exceptional information access and significant power to affect the actions of the incumbent. They provide power to interfere in the market and have detailed information on industry costs and performance. Its scope includes critical issues such as price levels, universal service provision and merger control. As such mechanism mostly applies to incumbents, Golden Shares provide a powerful information and influence channel for the Government on the regulated firm, in addition to the delegated responsibilities of the regulatory agency. Since it provides specific information and influence, it is expected that the existence of golden shares (value 1 of GOLDSHR) increase the involvement of the AA in the considered regulatory domains. The set of explanatory variables corresponding to the transparency dimension is the following.
Degree of AA's discretion (MRGEXBF).
The proxy variable used for this concept was associated to whether or not a merger that were normally declared illegal might be authorized anyway on the basis of business failure. The dummy takes value 1 for cases in which this merger review exception applies and 0 when it does not. This variable identifies the cases in which the antitrust agency have enough autonomy to apply discretional exceptions to standard merger controls, which then fall out of the scope of competition development or protection. In particular, business bankruptcy is considered as an arbitrary criterion for merger approval that damages the consistency of antitrust criteria and enforcement in order to protect firms that had failed to survive. As an indicator of poorer transparency of the AA, it is expected that such exception to merger 7 European Commision (1999): "Much of the current regulatory framework addresses the need to create a competitive market, for example by requiring incumbent operators to meet all requests for access to and interconnection with its network. Once a competitive market is effectively established, many of these provisions should no longer be necessary and would therefore be sufficient to rely on the application of competition rules of the Treaty".
review (value 1 of MRGEXBF) reduce the involvement of the AA in the considered regulatory domains. subset of indicators. Authors underlies that corruption is understood in this indicator as ''the exercise of public power for private gain''. In such procedure, GRAFT is one of six resulting dimensions of governance. Consequently, since the lack of transparency negatively affects the ISA more than the AA, the larger the value of the index the poorer the overall business perception of transparency and the larger the expected involvement of the AA.
Price regulation transparency (PRICETRANSP)
.
Empirical results
Separated regressions were performed to analyze each of the five dimensions Due to cross-section nature of these regressions, we have paid attention to the multicollinearity problem. Correlations among independent variables are presented in Table 4 and show that no severe collinearity problem would affect regression results. In the model specifications performed below, some of the independent variables might not seem to be exogenous which would indicate a potential risk of endogeneity problem.
Nevertheless, the proxies used in these specifications minimize the risk of reverse causation for explaining institutional arrangement through transparency and competence variables. Independent variables are identified according to their competence or transparency nature. Variation of these independent variables comes from cross-country differences in their regulatory framework, institutional framework and market performance. Table   5 also includes the probabilities associated to each of the score levels calculated from the fitted equations.
Additionally, in order to correct a potential problem of he teroscedasticity all regressions were also performed with robust errors. Although the sample includes a large degree of similarity among the countries, the potentiality of this problem might be associated to their degree of difference in terms of market sizes, institutional frameworks and privatization experience, among others. In those results, robust errors do not introduce important changes to specifications of all models; as expected, significant coefficients keep relatively the same values and p-values are modified to a minor extent.
OECD International Regulation Database
11 Djankov (2002) Note that elasticities of one specific independent variable on the probability that the dependent variable take all possible values should add to one. Therefore the elasticity of an independent variable on the probability that the institutional arrangement take a middle value (joint jurisdiction) can be obtained from the difference between one and the elasticities corresponding to the extreme values of the independent variable:
In Table 5 , Model 1 corresponding to institutional arrangements in Pricing regulation identifies both competence (ENFSPEED) and transparency conditions (MRGEXBF) as significant determinants.
Speed of antitrust enforcement (ENFSPEED):
The negative sign is consistent a framework in which a reinforced enforcement of the antitrust agency reduces part of the competence advantages of the ISA vis-à-vis the AA. For example powerful and specific powers to access information and influence strategies (through Golden Shares) provide the Government muscle to do what defines part of the ISA competence advantage and they would also increase the preference for the AA. Based on Table 6 , the existence of Golden Shares or per se prohibition of unfair competition reduces the probability of a leading ISA in pricing regulation in 25%.
Degree of AA's discretion (MRGEXBF).
Jointly with rebalancing price structures, controlling abuses of dominant positions is the key current objective of price regulation and that usually justifies the role of the competition specialized agency in defining its enforcement. Nevertheless, the positive sign of this larger degree of AA's discretion to apply arbitrary exceptions indicates that the resulting damage to transparency perception of antitrust procedures increases the preference for the ISA. As this regime enlarges the AA's discretion in a ground for exceptions specially exposed to collusive agreement 12 Greene (1997) with the regulated firm (business failure and bankruptcy cases), a non-antitrust agency becomes more preferred in regulating prices to compensate the competition risk created in merger control. Based on Table 6 , this feature of antitrust framework increases the probability of a leading ISA in pricing regulation in 52%. The model of pricing also showed the expected effects of market permeability (INCENTIN) , and corruption perception (GRAFT) on institutional arrangements. Given its relevance, it was rather striking that price regulation transparency (PRICETRANSP)
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had a poor degree of significance.
The regression exercise on the responsibility assignment in Licensing (Model 2 in Table 5 ) identified both competence variables INCENTIN and ENFSPEED and one transparency variable PRICETRANSP as significant factors.
Competition Development (INCENTIN).
The negative sign is consistent with the idea that a faster entry of newcomers (and more complex competitive context) highlights the competence of the AA to deal with competitive problems and increases its preference. Table 6 ).
Speed of antitrust enforcement (ENFSPEED):
Price regulation transparency (PRICETRANSP):
Its positive sign indicates that transparency in information sources for price regulations and publishing of regulatory decisions, working as devices for enforcement accountability, promote the involvement of the ISA.
Other transparency variables (MRGEXBF and GRAFT) were not statistically significant but conceptually consistent with their expected effects: the "attractiveness" of the AA to enforce licensing tasks is deteriorated by discretionary antitrust enforcement (MRGEXBF) but it is improved by a higher perception of corruption (GRAFT).
In Table 5 , Model 3 shows that the institutional involvement in tasks for Competition Policy in telecommunications is jointly explained the complete set of competence and transparency variables.
Competition Development (INCENTIN). It shows a negative sign that is consistent
with the expected positive effect that faster entry of newcomers to telecom market on the regulatory involvement of the AA. Faster consolidation of alternative operators makes competitive dynamics more complex and that creates a context in which the AA can make a good performance.
Speed of antitrust enforcement (ENFSPEED):
The speed of the decision process in merger review procedures is useful in telecommunications because of the presence of significant first mover advantages and an intensive merger activity in this business. The negative sign in the merger review regression is consistent with the preference for more involvement of the AA when it is ''equipped'' with more prompt procedures to enforce significant sanctions. When this is not the case, the usual perception that the ISA has a faster procedure track due to the intensive use of prescriptive measures becomes an incentive for more involvement of the ISA in merger review procedures.
For example, the effects of per se prohibition of unfair competition or the possibility of the AA to impose directly mandatory orders on a leading role of the AA (Competition Policy = 1) and a leading role of the ISA (Competition Policy = 3) were a probability increase of 26% and a probability reductio n of 10% respectively (see Table 6 ).
Degree of AA's discretion (MRGEXBF)
. A large degree of AA's discretion to apply arbitrary exceptions 13 , may work as a signal of poor consistency and transparency of the antitrust framework and agency. This drawback is particularly sensitive in the context of 13 Such as approving a merger that would otherwise be illegal based on the risk of business failure or bankruptcy.
merger review itself and the "structural" strength of the AA to assume that task become blurred and explain the positive effect on the preference for more involvement of the ISA. This enforcement feature increases the probability of a leading AA in competition enforcement over 45% (See Table 6 ).
Price regulation transparency (PRICETRANSP):
The more complete information sources for price regulation and tougher requirements of decisions publicity the larger the ext ernal verifiability of such decisions and the smaller the scope for enforcer discretionality. As with licensing regression, the positive sign of this variable indicates that more transparent contexts of enforcement also promotes the preference for the ISA in merger review enforcement. In particular, information verifiability for price regulation provides information pieces that are also relevant to merger review cases such as cost structure and relevant market definition. Consequently, more verifiable information (larger PRICETRANSP values) increases external control of the ISA and, therefore, increases the preference for its involvement in merger enforcement.
Corruption Perception (GRAFT):
The sign is negative and this implies that the preference for stronger and more formal involvement of the AA in ISA's matters increases with the degree of general corruption perception. This might indicate that more social awareness of corruption drive stronger requirements of safeguards against the collusion risk. In this case, it is provided through the indirect control of a more transparent AA.
Model 4 of Table 5 shows that the institutional arrangement in Interconnection is determined by two variables discussed above.
Speed of antitrust enforcement (ENFSPEED):
Speed of enforcement is critical to interconnection regimes because of the irreversible implications of network investments "governed" by interconnection deals. Consequently, a large value of ENFSPEED compensates the AA's delay perception. In particular, the existence of Golden Shares (one of the three indicators considered in ENFSPEED) provides regulatory principals enough power to influence over the industry beyond any agency decision-making procedure. As network investment involve time-compression diseconomies 14 , this feature for direct regulatory intervention fits with the competitive sensitivity of interconnection delays and the requirement to solve its disputes as earlier as possible.
Additionally, such special powers associated to Golden Shares usually correspond to one specific operator, the privatized one (generally the incumbent). Consequently, another advantage of Golden Shares for interconnection issues comes from its specific power over the particular firm that is critical for network access: the dominant operator.
A similar effect to promote involvement of the AA results from a fast-track context of the antitrust agency to impose mandatory orders 15 .
Degree of AA's discretion (MRGEXBF).
Countries with this potential degree of discretionary power in merger enforcement (arbitrary approval of anticompetitive deals)
would drive perception that the AA is less transparent than without it. Although interconnection is not part of competition policy, both issues are relate with competition development i n telecommunications and it might explain its role in determining the institutional arrangement of interconnection enforcement.
Although they were not statistically significant, INCENTIN and PRICETRANSP also showed the expected effect on institutional arrangements. On the other hand, the positive effect of GRAFT (although no significant) is contrary to the expected effect.
This ambiguity might indicate that fact that larger corruption awareness may also imply more efforts to control corruption.
The ordered logit regression of the fifth regulatory dimension (Model 5 in Table 5 ),
Coordination, showed the following variables as significant.
14 Once networks are built by the incumbent, there accumulation time per unit of network asset by new entrants tend to be larger or the amount of investment is proportionally larger to obtain an equivalent network design in the same time as the incumbent. See Cave and Williamson (1996).
Competition Development (INCENTIN).
The negative sign is consistent with the expected effect of competition degree on the institutional preference for the AA. The larger the market share of new entrants (potential competition degree) the more complicated the market dynamics and the more frequent the episodes of competition restriction. Therefore, the institutional preference for the AA when competitive penetration is larger is due to the content of its work and expertise that make it better equipped to face such conditions. This general advantage promotes that AA's advocacy role and interventions in ISA's decisions and proceedings have more formal base and stronger influence.
Speed of antitrust enforcement (ENFSPEED).
As in the merger review regression, its negative sign indicates more involvement of the AA in the ISA decisions is observed when the AA has more powerful and faster sanction procedures. This implies that countries impose over the ISA more controls from the AA when the later already has a significant competence for correcting anticompetitive behaviors.
Degree of AA's discretion (MRGEXBF).
As in pricing, competition and interconnection regressions, the sign is positive. This high degree of AA's discretion for arbitrary decisions implies a poorer external control of the AA and reduces the attractiveness of the AA for controlling the ISA's (or Ministry's) decisions. This discretional framework would increase the probability of informal and weak coordination between the ISA and AA in 56% and reduce the probability of a formal and binding involvement of the AA in ISA jurisdiction in 78%.
However, although no statistically significant, the sign corresponding to PRICETRANSP is contradictory with the expected one. This model specification provides a fully balanced structure of probabilities that the predicted value fall bellow, within and above the cut points, to the extent the three of them have the same probability.
Finally, for the composite index of institutional arrangements an OLS regression 16 was performed because of its continuous nature (Model 6 in Table 5 ). Since its composite nature this model presents a wid er scope of determining factors than other models of specific regulatory domains.
In the competence dimension, both INCENTIN and ENFSPEED were significant, PRICETRANSP is referred to information sources and rules for price and interconnection regulation, it becomes significant for this overall index because the obtained information is also worthy for other enforcement fields (for instance merger review and licensing) and its value goes beyond such framework. Similarly, MRGEXBF seems to be coherent with the assumption that the AA has an overall transparency advantage and this variable capture conditions in which it is poorer. Finally, the perception of overall corruption (GRAFT) as a driver of more involvement of the AA was consistent with the negative sign but also non-significant in this model.
In addition to the model specification defined in Model 6 for the composite index, six additional specifications were performed to include three institutional control variables corresponding to alternative explanations of the institutional arrangements based on the references included in the model discussion (section 2), as well as three key performance variables. Table 7 shows the results of those specifications.
The first of these model specifications (Model 7 in Table 7 ) included a measure for political stability using as proxy an index of political constraints (POLCON02) 17 . From 16 As well as the ordered logit regressions, OLS ones were also performed with robust errors. 17 "the extent to which a change in the preferences of any one actor may lead to a change in the discussion in Section 2 regarding the Credibility Explanation considered by Gilardi preferences for the telecom-specific agency as leading regulator. Nevertheless, not only these variables were not statistically significant but also their effects were only consistent with the expected ones for telecom penetration (PHNPTR90).
Discussion and further research
In this study, we have analyzed the determinants of the choice of countries on institutional arrangements among the agencies involved in telecommunications regulation (ISA, Ministry and AA). From the results, summarized in Table 8 , we find that the competence-transparency explanation to the pattern of institutional arrangements have empirical support.
19 See Kaufmann (1999) Based on the number of significant proxy variables, we find that the dependence of institutional arrangements in each of the five regulatory dimensions is balanced between transparency conditions and safeguards and competence factors. Among the considered regulatory domains, Pricing and Interconnection coincide in both the importance that transparency variables play for explaining their institutional arrangements and the set of explanatory variables that were significant (existence of golden shares, AA's over-discretion and transparency framework for interconnection price regulation). Consequently, the jurisdiction maps in (final and interconnection) price regulation have been determined by similar criteria. This is consistent with the fact that both domains have a very similar set of activities to perform: cost allocation, performance analysis, and definition of bundles or baskets of services, among others.
Given that the transparency proxies are mostly associated to safeguards against the a The Competition model specification was not only robust in terms of the type effects obtained and but also very balanced in terms of the number of competence and transparency variables identified as significant. In this case, the significance of INCENTIN and MRGEXBF is particularly relevant to explain institutional arrangements in merger reviews: competitive dynamics generated by newcomers boosts expertise preference of the AA and arbitrary decisions in merger reviews damages AA's transparency perception.
In particular, the composite index regression was robust in terms of capturing almost all independent variables that were significant to regressions performed on the domains that "build" such index.
In addition to the Competence-Transparency explanation, alternative relationships were also considered to explain institutional arrangements. Political constraints (Credibility Explanation), overall regulatory intensity and telecom penetration were consistent with the expected effects on institutional arrangements but none was significant. 
